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Samantha Johnson 
 
Before the 1940s the word genocide did not exist. There was no name for unique mass 
killings involving thousands to millions of targeted people. A man named Raphael Lemkin 
coined and popularized the word genocide and took on the responsibility to get the Genocide 
Convention passed. In the 1980s the United States finally joined The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Genocide Convention), however this 
came with many clauses and restrictions, causing the terms to be less effective. The convention 
defined genocide as any criminal acts harming or destroying national, ethnic, racial, or religious 
groups, but left the terms very vague and confusing. It gave no specifics on a number of crimes 
or deaths which must be reached to qualify as genocide. Even with the passing of the Genocide 
Convention, there still was no judiciary system to enforce the international law and give 
repercussions. Many nations, including the U.S., remain resistant to intervene on genocide, and 
the United Nations has little authority due to limited funding and no military power. The 
Genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda are strong examples of the lack of willingness of the United 
States and international community to acknowledge genocide, intervene on the crimes, and hold 
war criminals responsible for their action. 
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Regardless of the reasons behind intervention, genocide should not be ignored. 
Sovereignty should not prevent leaders from being held accountable for their actions, because the 
crimes create long lasting devastation in the regions and war criminals are fully aware of their 
choices. Without the assertion of Raphael Lemkin, the word genocide most likely would not 
exist, and there would not be international recognition in legislature with the aim to prevent the 
acts. This all occurred within the last hundred years, and even if there is still a lack of 
intervention or enforcement, it has gained international attention. As an international power, the 
United States has the responsibility to act on genocide to ensure global stability and security, 
because the U.S. has the ability to do so and is looked up to by numerous countries. There are 
many ways for the U.S. to respond to genocide and intervene in both safe and cost-effective 
ways. Reasons supporting intervention include for strategic reasons, economics and moral. In 
this paper, I argue the evidence supports intervention on genocide with military power for 
strategic reasons in both Bosnia and Rwanda would have been beneficial for the interests of 
those suffering as well as the involved nations. This paper proceeds with a review of literature 
conveying the positives of intervention, the research methods pursued when forming my 
argument, the case studies of Bosnia and Rwanda including summaries and U.S. responses, and 
an analysis presenting my findings on genocide and intervention.  
 
LITERTURE REVIEW 
 
 After a deep study of the various genocides which have recently occurred, a main 
question that arises is: should outside nations intervene or not intervene in sovereign state 
affairs? Through reviewing over ten articles to compile research, I came to the conclusion that 
the U.S. should implement intervention when genocide is occurring in all cases where enough 
information is presented to the U.S. to know there is even the potential for crimes similar to 
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genocide. There are many reasons for a foreign nation to support intervention, including moral, 
economic, political and, most importantly, strategic. From a deep analysis of the list of sources I 
have organized, it will be clear to see the difference of opinions for intervention from multiple 
scholarly authors, which contain all relevant and valid points which strengthen my argument.   
 Before looking into the many positive reasons supporting intervention, it is important to 
note the key figure who was against it, President Bill Clinton. President Clinton, who was in 
power during multiple genocides, did not want to directly involve the United States in either 
Bosnia or Rwanda. From a White House document of an exchange with reporters on Bosnia, 
President Clinton stated, “Since the problem is in Europe, the American forces would be in the 
minority. So there will be no American group troops involved in this action” (1994, p. 2). By 
refusing to even use the word “genocide” in relation to Bosnia or any of the other cases, 
President Clinton showed his reluctance to admit to the events occurring in the fear it would hold 
him accountable for action under the Genocide Convention. Even if citizens initially supported 
intervention, the loss of soldier life, similar to what happened in Somalia, would most likely 
backfire on him. At the risk of lowering his popularity in the polls and placing a question on his 
second-term candidacy, intervention was not worth the possible gamble for the Clinton 
administration. This conveys how President Clinton’s non-intervention methods were overall 
weakly supported and not successful.  
 On the contrary of President Clinton's argument, many scholars believe intervention is 
necessary due to moral reasoning. The author of “A Problem from Hell”, Power (2002) claims, 
“The first and most compelling reason is moral. When innocent life is being taken away on such 
a scale and the United States has the power to stop the killing at a reasonable risk, it has a duty to 
act” (p. 512). It is hard for people to understand the true number of victims murdered during 
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genocide or wrap their mind around the gruesome treatment used, but in Power’s argument it is 
morally and ethically unjust to watch it unfold without getting involved. She also mentions that 
no U.S. president has made genocide a priority, and the fact that a constant policy of 
nonintervention leads to the perception of a broken American political system. In her viewpoint 
even if moral intervention presents somewhat of a risk to the U.S., it is nothing in comparison to 
what the genocide victims deal with. Similar to Power's argument, Doughlas Jehl from the New 
York Times wrote an article in 1994, which generally stated if U.S. citizens knew the full extent 
what was happening during genocide, the voters would be shocked and want an immediate 
response of intervention.   
 Power says intervention is the right approach, because, morally, it is right to defend the 
lives of those defenseless. However, Wertheim disagrees, because he believes intervention has a 
larger benefit for strategic reasons as a military tool. He advocates the aggressive states got away 
with their crimes, because no soldiers were dispatched to challenge them. Wertheim also 
believes military intervention should be considered when the rate of killing in a country exceeds 
the U.S. murder rate, which seems to be an interesting perspective to look at. In his article 
Wertheim (2010) uses an outside source to support his argument stating, “It must also be 
recognized that only the United States has the political and military muscles to lead such a 
response to genocide” (p. 159). The essence of Wertheim’s arguments is the U.S. had the 
strength in military power to intervene during genocide without a high threat of danger to 
soldiers. If troops were sent over and involved during the genocide, not only would the killings 
have ended sooner, but the leaders would have been held responsible for the crimes. These 
conclusions add weight to my arguments that strategic intervention is the most beneficial for the 
U.S. due to the military capabilities.  
5 
 
 
 Similar to Power and Wertheim, David Model also supports intervention, but on much 
different grounds. The important factor, he argues, is intervention due to international law 
through the Genocide Convention. Model went into detail explaining Article 1 of the Genocide 
Convention which shows the obligation of states to prevent genocide when they are aware of it 
occurring or the possibility of occurrence. Due to the fact that State Department and Intelligence 
documents were given to the President and his officials daily, he was aware of what happened in 
both cases on Bosnia and Rwanda. Model (2009) asserts, “Not only did the United States fail to 
act on its own or collectively with other state but deliberately took actions to prevent the United 
Nations from acting” (p. 2). In other words, Model believes the U.S. leaders had the knowledge 
of genocide occurring, but refused to admit the severity of the actions to avoid intervening, even 
though the Genocide convention holds them responsible. Model’s theory of intervention is 
extremely useful, because it sheds light on the difficult problems in the Genocide Convention 
due to the lack of enforcement in international law.  
 After looking at the reasons supporting intervention, it’s important to look at the cases of 
genocide in which intervention could have been used more efficiently. Both in Rwanda and 
Bosnia, intervention was not a policy the U.S. showed a great concern or effort in dealing with.   
Gourevitch and Randall give insight into these genocides through pro-intervention perspectives.  
  Gourevitch uses real stories from the Tutsi victims in his non-fiction book, We Wish to 
Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda, to 
demonstrate how intervention on behalf of the U.S. could have saved thousands of lives.  
Specifically, in Rwanda, strategic intervention could have been implemented to jam the radios, 
which gave killing orders. Also the U.S. could have delivered the promised armored personnel 
carriers in a timely fashion to allow the victims to protect themselves. According to Gourevitch 
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the U.S. was willing to give armored personnel carriers to the Tutsi in Rwanda, but only under 
UN power, and they sat on the runway in Germany waiting for the UN to pay the rental fees. In 
general the U.S. failed to get them there before the killing ended and did not give the people 
protection. Another strategy of intervention would be through jamming the radio signals, which 
the U.S. Air Force could have done from the air. Gourevitch (1999) wrote, “The radio transmitter 
of RTLM would have been an obvious, and easy, first target” (p. 313). Both of these plans are 
overall simple forms of intervention which use military resources without the risk of endangering 
soldiers or costing the U.S. an extreme amount.  
  Richard Randall wrote a scholarly article on the speech given by Stephen Walker at 
Brown University. Walker believed the United States' hesitancy to intervene in Bosnia or act 
with aggression caused a great deal of lives to be lost. As an ex-diplomat Walker, is considered 
an expert in the field of intervention policies. He strongly believes the U.S. arms embargo 
contributed to the genocide in Bosnia. In his view the U.S. took on the perspective that it was too 
late to become involved, when in fact more people were still being murdered. Walker insisted, 
“The embargo not only is ineffective and morally reprehensible, but is legally invalid under the 
terms of the United Nations charter” (Randall, 1994, p. 1). The speech given by Walker and the 
article are from 1994, when the Bosnian genocide was occurring. If scholars were able to find 
means of intervention the U.S. could have implemented with little cost, then the government 
officials and President Clinton should have been aware of these. Randall’s article shows not only 
strategic intervention, but overall demonstrates the moral aspect to at least give the victims a 
chance to protect themselves. Randal also empathizes “sustainable peace” rather than “paper 
peace”, which I believe is a great point of view to take. The government is focused on how it 
looks from the outside but people need to recognize, if there is not stability enforced, it could 
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occur again. No matter what strategy is used, it is clear to see that intervention would have been 
possible and beneficial in both Rwanda and Bosnia.  
 In the discussion of genocide, one controversial issue has been the policy of intervention. 
On one hand, President Clinton argued against intervention for his personal political issues and 
the fear of losing human life. On the other hand, Power contends intervention is a moral 
obligation. Others even maintain intervention is required through the Genocide Convention or an 
economic benefit. My own view is the U.S. should intervene with its military for strategic 
reasons.  Having reviewed the literature on intervention, I think that the U.S. should have acted 
more aggressively and involved themselves in both Bosnia and Rwanda to demonstrate that as a 
political and military world power, they will not let genocide occur. Although intervention was 
unfortunately not properly implemented, the sources I found strongly support my argument and 
show the validity of my claim.   
 
METHODS  
 
 After studying various genocides from the past century and conducting research, I have 
found that the United States should have implemented a position of intervention with military 
power for strategic reasons, which include creating new alliances, establishing military bases and 
international trade. The specific cases of Bosnia and Rwanda support my belief that the U.S. has 
the responsibility as international leaders to show that nations cannot just stand by and witness 
genocide occur without taking action. In both of these cases, the U.S. had little to no involvement 
besides giving costly humanitarian aid in the aftermath. In the case of Bosnia, the U.S. refused to 
lift the arms embargo, and when aerial strikes were enforced, they were extremely effective, but 
were not enforced long enough. In Rwanda the killings were systematically planned and aided by 
the use of the radio signals, so the U.S. could have jammed the radio to make the killings much 
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more difficult or sent armored personnel carriers in a timely fashion.  In both Bosnia and 
Rwanda, the U.S. could have used military technology and given protection to the groups in 
danger to allow them to protect themselves. These two case studies of genocide prove how 
intervention is necessary and effective.  
I purposely chose to use these two cases to support my argument rather than the other 
cases of genocide, because they best display hypothetical military actions which could have 
halted the crimes. These merit my time and energy by showing the U.S. had the knowledge of 
what was happening in the region, even if they denied it at the time. The U.S., under the 
presidency of Clinton, was proposing many military actions but reluctantly delivered. This 
hesitancy and slow delivery of promised plans caused the genocide to unfold with little 
consequences.    
Although many critics argue it was too costly and dangerous to intervene on genocide, 
there were cost-effective and safe procedures which could have been implemented to overall 
benefit the U.S. (Power 2002, Randall 1994, Wertheim 2010). Some of these actions include 
airstrikes rather than sending ground troops, intervening on radio signals, and holding leaders 
accountable for war crimes. These measures are more cost-effective than the humanitarian aid 
needed to help recovery in the regions after the mass killings and displacements from genocide 
occurred. Intervening is strategically effective for the United States, because it ensures global 
stability and promotes strong international relations. This also promotes the dominance of the 
U.S. overall and the strength of military power.  
 This work suffers, like all, because the alternate strategies which could have occurred 
during genocide are probabilistic and cannot be demonstrated. Also all the evidence is limited to 
the data collected during the 1980s and 1990s, and although this does not seem very long ago, 
9 
 
 
the technology and media coverage during that time span was far less than what we are capable 
of today. Another important fact to take note of is many articles are swayed to a specific 
perspective, resulting in opinionated documents. These flaws come with any form of research 
and are not detrimental to my work.  Using a mix of new and older articles gives updated 
numbers, as more evidence has been uncovered by new technology. I aimed to create a mix of 
different opinions and different reasons supporting intervention to show a broader view. Finally, 
although there is not absolute certainty that my agreement would have lead to a more successful 
outcome, there is an overwhelming amount of scholarly sources supporting me.  
 Overall it is important to analyze historical context and study the numerous genocides 
which have occurred in order to understand why it may be beneficial or harmful for a nation to 
become involved.  The methodology I used to conduct my research was through case studies. 
Through finding expert opinions and secondary literature, I looked into the pros and cons for 
intervention. After taking on the pro-intervention stance, there were many reasons to intervene 
including economics, ethics, politics and strategically. As stated about I believe the most 
influential reason for U.S. intervention would be strategic. Having reviewed ten articles 
including primary sources and White House documents, I have found that my argument is valid 
and supported.   
 
CASE STUDY: BOSNIA  
 
During the time period of 1991-1995, the Christian Serbians killed approximately 
200,000 Bosnian Muslims, and over two million more Bosnians were displaced. Marshal Tito 
took the position as the communist leader in charge of Yugoslavia for forty-five years. Although 
the nation was comprised of six individual republics and was very ethically diverse, Tito gained 
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popularity and respect, becoming known as a national father figure, through creating peace 
among the many cultures. Power (2002) described the rule of Marshal Tito through stating:   
“Because the national story in Tito’s era was one of ‘brotherhood 
and unity’ in which ethnic identity was discounted and even disparaged, 
and because the communities had lived intermingled or in neighboring 
villages for so many years, many found it even harder to take seriously the 
threat from their neighbors”(p. 256).  
After his death in 1980, early violence was predicted for the nation as tensions grew 
between the Christian Serbians and the Muslim Bosnians. The Serbians gained a new leader, 
which allowed them to become powerful through controlling the government, military and 
education. This also meant they had a majority control of all weapons. The Bosnians, who 
wanted an individual state, were left defenseless after a UN arms embargo in 1991 prevented the 
shipment of weapons into the area. This allowed the Serbians to take over complete dominance 
and begin an ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian culture.  
All non-Serbians living within the nation soon had to follow a military enforced curfew 
and list of restrictions. This included meeting in public places, hunting, fishing, carrying a 
weapon, traveling by car, gathering in groups of more then three men, selling real estate and 
wearing a uniform including military or police. Usually without warning the Serbians would 
come through towns with machine guns and begin random killings in the streets, or through 
entering homes. They also destroyed homes to give Bosnians no place to return and live. Sexual 
violence through an organized rape campaign was another horrific crime used to dehumanize the 
culture. Power (2002) describes, “They forced fathers to castrate their sons or molest their 
daughters; they humiliated and raped young women” (p. 251). Bosnians were deported from 
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their towns and often brought to camps. Most of the killing done within the camps were targeted 
to the male population, and although they weren’t categorized as extermination camps, it is 
estimated that 10,000 people died within them. One account from within a Serbian camp claimed 
men were “Held in metal cages and killed in groups of ten to fifteen every few days”(Power, 
2002, p. 272). The United States had known about these camps since May of 1992, and although 
Western journalists began to hear stories shortly after of the horrid events occurring, it was 
difficult to know if the stories were valid. Top political leaders categorized the events occurring 
as a civil war between the two cultures, even though all evidence pointed toward the deliberate 
attempt of the Serbians to diminish the Bosnian culture.  
With footage of the Bosnian genocide flashing all over the news back in the United States 
and reporters getting first-hand stories and pictures of the camps, Americans were shocked at the 
resemblance to the infamous concentration camps from the Nazi regime.  Not only because of 
the forced relocations into camps, but also the fact that it was happening for a second time in 
Europe. This garnered more attention for the crisis and popularity among the American people to 
intervene and provide aid.  
Cognitive Misers in the U.S.  
Although President George H. W. Bush knew about the Serbian camps, he never publicly 
acknowledged them or demanded they be closed. He repeatedly used the term “all means 
necessary” toward giving aid to Bosnia, but refused to send troops. Instead he gave limited 
funding to other groups willing to carry out short-lived action through aid relief. By focusing on 
the Somalia famine, President Bush overlooked the deeper problems occurring in Bosnia. He 
never had his high level staff do deeper research into the matter and would simply ask for an 
update on the death toll, as he sat back avoiding intervention. When asked about lifting the arms 
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embargo to aid the Bosnians, President Bush replied,  “There are enough arms there already. 
We’ve got to stop the killing some way, and I don’t think it’s enhanced by more and more 
[weapons]” (Power, 2002, p. 263). Although there were large amounts of weapons throughout 
the nation, they were not evenly distributed, and the Bosnians were left defenseless against the 
majority Serbians.   
 President Clinton showed interest in Bosnia early on, and before his presidency talked of 
the military intervention needed to stop the killings. President Clinton claimed, “I would begin 
with air power against the Serbs to try to restore the basic conditions of humanity”(Power, 2002, 
p. 274).  However in 1992, after his election, when it came time to take action against the 
Serbians, President Clinton had reluctance to intervene. Some reasoning behind this is President 
Clinton had no military experience himself, causing him to be ridiculed as a draft dodger and not 
in support of using military power. He also blamed the fighting between the Serbians and 
Bosnians to be “ancient hatreds”, stating it fell under the category of a civil war between the 
ethnically and religiously different groups. The final reason which caused the most reluctance to 
intervene was the fear that resided from fighting in Vietnam. The United States had little interest 
in going to war against Vietnam, and it ended up becoming an extremely costly war in both lives 
and money. It was also difficult to leave after entering and became an extremely unpopular war. 
The Clinton administration did not want to get involved in a foreign affair, if it would cause the 
president to drop in the popularity polls while he was still in his first term.  
  In August of 1993, a group of state department officials became fed up with the lack of 
intervention. They believed the current policy would never change or improve and couldn’t grasp 
the lack of willingness to stop the genocide. Power (2002) claims, “They found the U.S. policy 
so timid, so passive, and so doomed to fail that they chose to disassociate themselves with the 
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administration and go public with their discontent” (p. 313). This drew in the public attention 
and raised further questions among the Americans. In 1994 President Clinton took charge in a 
NATO campaign which focused on creating safe zones and banning the use of heavy weapons, 
which would be enforced by aerial strikes. President Clinton himself declared the risks of NATO 
bombing would be minimal. Although this plan was extremely effective when enforced properly, 
it unfortunately was short-lived.  Power (2002) asserts, “For several months Sarajevans lived free 
of artillery and sniper fire. But when the Serbs resumed shelling the safe areas the president’s 
attention had drifted elsewhere and NATO did not bomb” (p. 324). Without the force of the 
United States taking charge in the issue to support the campaign and gain support of NATO 
allies, it did not last long and made little difference in the long-term impact of the genocidal 
killings.  
Difference of Opinion:  
Although some may support President Clinton’s opinion, believing it was more of a civil 
war than genocide, the statistics found within Power’s book shows 95% of the killings were 
Serbian on Bosnian.  This statistic is among the information which was readily available to the 
U.S. policy makers during the time of the Bosnian genocide. In the text Power (2002) shows 
peacekeepers believed, “If the arms embargo were lifted or the Serbs bombed, humanitarian aid 
would be suspended… and the intended beneficiaries, Bosnian’s Muslims, made off far worse” 
(p. 306). I don’t find this to be true because the Bosnians had no defense to fight back against the 
Serbians who had complete control over military and government. If the United States lifted the 
embargo, provided the Bosnians with weapons, and perhaps some training, they would have been 
able to fight back, which could have decreased the death count. Also this would not put the U.S. 
troops into danger through fighting themselves, and the large amount of humanitarian aid would 
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not be needed if the killing decreased. The safe zones established by NATO, while enforced, 
were also effective, cheap and did not put any troops in direct danger. If the aerial strikes had 
been better enforced and supported by the U.S. military in a stronger way, then it could have 
made a bigger difference to end the genocide.   
Overall, this shows how the reluctance from within the United States government and 
lack of intervention did not benefit the Bosnian culture or put an end to the horrific genocide. 
Both President Bush and President Clinton diverted their focus to other foreign affairs, including 
Somalia and Haiti, instead of taking a risk in the crisis which really needed immediate attention.   
Enforcing Airstrikes:  
The best course of action the United States should have taken regarding the Bosnian 
genocide would have been getting directly involved from the beginning and not taking the 
accusations lightly.  Even if President Bush did not want to intervene, he could have at least put a 
stronger effort into having his administration gather research and specific information on the 
crisis occurring. As President Clinton ran for election, he made large promises, similar to most 
politicians, on the action he would take against the Serbians to stop the killings. Taking over near 
the climax of the genocide, I believe he had more of a responsibility to uphold his word and 
intervene.  Although President Clinton finally took some initiative through establishing safe 
zones and air strikes, along with NATO allies, he did not give it much effort before becoming 
distracted in another affair and losing interest. This campaign was proven effective while 
enforced and would have been the best course of action for the United States to take in order to 
end the Bosnian genocide faster and prevent further lose of lives.  
 President Clinton strongly believed that European nations should have invested more of 
their abilities to intervene in Bosnia and wanted them to support NATO rather than the U.S., 
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because in a sense they had more invested in geographical terms. Power (2002) implies this 
through stating, “The congressman took Clinton’s hand and said, “Bill, bomb the Serbs. You’ll 
be surprised how good it’ll make you feel.’ Unflustered, Clinton nodded thoughtfully for a few 
seconds and then blamed the Europeans for their hesitancy” (p. 326). Powerfully both 
economically and with military force, I find that the United States had a responsibility as an 
international leader to take charge of the genocide in Bosnia. President Clinton should have 
strongly enforced the safe zones with strict air strikes until the climate dissipated and a peace 
agreement could be reached. After the United States took lead, other nations would have 
followed close behind to stop the genocide, finally making grounds to show genocide will not be 
ignored or allowed any further. Without the intervention or holding the perpetrators responsible, 
events like Bosnia will continue to occur, because there are no repercussions in the international 
community.   
 
CASE STUDY: RWANDA  
 
With a daily killing rate which far exceeded any previous genocide, the Hutu of Rwanda 
killed 800,000 Tutsi citizens in 90 days. In Rwanda the Tutsi were the minority, only making up 
15 percent of the population, however they were also considered the elite. The colonial masters 
previously in charge of the region favored the Tutsi and gave them preferential treatment over 
the Hutu majority, allowing them to be the leaders and given higher education. The Tutsi and 
Hutu were groups identical in language and culture, and were integrated in neighborhoods and 
marriages. This made them relatively indistinguishable from each other. In spite of the 
similarities, they have had a long history of periodic violence and killings between both groups. 
This eventually led up to a civil war in Rwanda, which was settled by the Arusha Accords, a 
peace agreement that enforced a cease-fire.   
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In December of 1990, a Hutu paper published “Ten Commandments of the Hutu,” which 
was a list of strict rules and limitations the Hutu wished to impose on the Tutsi people. Two 
years after this publication, in 1992, the Hutu began to stockpile and distribute weapons. Power 
(2002) states, “As well as 581,000 machetes—one machete for every third adult Hutu” (p. 337). 
The following year the Hutu began a campaign to dehumanize the Tutsi calling them names like 
“cockroaches,” along with complying a list of names and addresses of Tutsi living among the 
communities.  
On April 6th, 1994 the Rwanda President, Juvenal Habyarimana, was killed in a 
mysterious plane crash. Immediately after his death, the government collapsed and the military 
took over power. The violence began within hours as radios announced the addresses of Tutsi 
people for systematic killings. Power (2002) observes:  
“In the countryside, where the slaughter gradually spread, the killing 
was done at first with firearms, but as more Hutu joined in the weapons 
became increasingly unsophisticated—knives, machetes, spears and the 
traditional masu, bulky clubs with nails protruding from them” (p. 334).  
This displays how brutal and barbaric the killing methods used on the Tutsi were. Young Hutu 
men did the majority of the killing and also utilized a rape campaign against the Tutsi women. 
This created a generation of rape babies usually part Hutu and part Tutsi which breeds out the 
Tutsi genes. The entire campaign of killing occurred mostly within 90 days and with little force 
to stop the Hutu. They killed 800,000 Tutsi, along with moderate Hutu leaders.  
A Crisis Ignored: 
 Major General Romeo Dallaire presided as the commander of the UN mission to act as 
peacekeepers and ensure the enforcement of the Arusha Accords in Rwanda. His multinational 
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force was made up of 2,000 soldiers, with about 800 of them from Belgium. A majority of the 
troops came from poor or weak nations; they were not well-trained nor well-armed. When the 
violent killings began in Rwanda, Dallaire asked for an expanded mandate and for more troops. 
He believed if he doubled the number of troops under his command to 5,000, he would be able to 
make an impact against the Hutu. After receiving and reading through the Genocide Convention, 
Dallaire stated, “I realized that genocide was when an attempt was made to eliminate a specific 
group, and this is precisely what we saw in the field” (Power, 2002, p. 358).  
The United States was extremely resistant to use the word genocide when talking about 
the events occurring in Rwanda in fear that if they acknowledged it was genocide, they would be 
held accountable and forced to respond. The Belgians played an important role in Rwanda 
through the sizable amount of troops they provided to the UN. After ten Belgians died, they 
wanted to get out of Rwanda, but did not want to seem weak or unwilling to help through 
leaving. The Belgians asked the U.S. for security or political cover, but instead the U.S. officials 
demanded the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers and refused to authorize UN military 
enforcement.  
President Bill Clinton addressed the issues in Rwanda by claiming, “ I have spoken out 
against the killings. We have called for a full investigation of these atrocities” (Power, 2002, 
377). Although he stated he did not support the Hutu killings and planned to further look into 
what was occurring, he did not even consider using military intervention to become involved. 
The United States and Europe however did successfully complete a plan to evacuate all “white 
people” from Rwanda. The U.S. evacuated overland without the need for military escort, while 
the Europeans seized the capital city airport to fly out their citizens. It was a relatively easy 
mission to complete, with no causalities and low costs. However, the Tutsi people surrounded 
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the airport and begged the Westerners not to leave, afraid of what would happen without any 
enforcement watching. Power (2002) explains: 
“When the peacekeepers had departed out through one gate, Hutu 
militiamen entered through another, firing machine guns and throwing 
grenades. Most of the 2,000 gathered were killed. In the three days during 
which some 4,000 foreigners were evacuated, about 20,000 Rwandans were 
killed” (p. 353). 
With the Tutsi confined in a tight area around the secure airport with no way to escape, the Hutu 
came through and easily killed them all once the Americans and Europeans fled.  
 After more details and images from Rwanda were revealed, people began to question if 
there was a genocide occurring. International public pressure rose, and President Clinton was 
forced to act, even though a majority of the killings already occurred. On May 19th, the UN 
asked for 50 armored personnel carriers (APCs) from the U.S., and on May 31st the U.S. agreed 
to send them to Rwanda. However many bureaucratic roadblocks from the Pentagon delayed and 
stalled the shipment. The Pentagon began questioning everything, including, “Who would pay 
for the vehicles? Should the vehicles be tracked or wheeled? Would the UN buy them or simply 
lease them? Who would pay for shipping costs?”(Power, 2002, 380). After finally deciding to 
repaint all 50 of the APCs to cover U.S. numbers and flags, they were shipped in July. By the 
time they arrived in July, the genocide had in most terms come to an end, making the action too 
late to help. 
There were many reasons behind the lack of reporting while the Rwanda genocide was 
occurring. Some smaller reasons include the size and geography of the nation: Rwanda is small, 
extremely poor, and not well-known. The genocide also occurred relatively quickly, mostly 
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within 90 days, not allowing much time for a response. The Bosnian genocide was still occurring 
at this time and, as a European country, received far more media coverage. The United States was 
still involved in Somalia, with the famine crisis occurring and the failed attempt to provide 
humanitarian aid. In South Africa Nelson Mandela was elected into presidency in 1994 and 
famously ending the apartheid regime. In her book Power displays that in May of 1994 there were 
2,500 reporters in South Africa reporting on Nelson Mandela, yet in Rwanda the number never 
exceeded 15. Many times the reporters remained in bordering countries and reported on false 
stories with skewed numbers. The fact that Africa was also viewed as unsophisticated and 
unstable led to a lack of support or interest toward the killings occurring within Rwanda.   
United States Fighting Back: 
 Overall the United States response to the Rwanda genocide was a failure, due to the lack 
of intervention and an unwillingness to provide aid. From the start, President Clinton and high-
level officials within the U.S. had no plans to become involved in Rwanda, and their reluctance to 
use the word genocide prevented most Americans from knowing the severity of what was 
occurring. After the genocide President Clinton made a half-hour appearance in Rwanda, 
remaining at the airport to give an apology. This showed an insincere and bad display due to the 
fact that President Clinton chose not to intervene, when he could have prevented the death of 
thousands of Tutsi.  
  I believe that the United States should have implemented a plan that directly aided Romeo 
Dallaire and used military intervention to stop the Hutu. The U.S. should have given complete 
support to the U.N. and helped Dallaire receive the 5,000 troops he believed were needed to 
apprehend the Hutu militia. Although the Clinton administration stated they did not have support 
from within the U.S. and it would have been unpopular to become involved, President Clinton 
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could have altered U.S. responses through explaining his reasoning to intervene. If he used the 
word genocide and explained the horrific details of the killings, he would build a base of public 
support. The Hutu were also hesitant to kill in front of Westerners, so the increase of UN troops 
and surveillance could have potentially decreased killings.  
 Another course of action that could have been used simultaneously with the U.N. troops, 
or in place of it, to prevent the risk of troops being killed would have been creating radio 
interference. The radios were a critical component of the killing, as the Hutu leaders would give 
specific names, addresses and times to kill Tutsi people. Tony Marley, a U.S. military liaison 
explained:  
“The United States could destroy the antenna. It could transmit ‘counter 
broadcasts’ urging perpetrators to stop the genocide. Or it could jam the hate 
radio stations broadcasts. This could have been done from an airborne platform 
such as the Air National Guards Commando Solo airplane” (Power, 2002,371).  
Although leaders claim the cost of jamming the radio was too high, President Clinton asked 
Congress for $320 million for emergency relief funds and received $170 million. The cost for the 
National Guard planes to fly would be around $8,500 an hour, which is far less than the relief 
funds. If the use of radio transmissions or jamming were implemented and prevented deaths in the 
first place, the relief would not have been needed. If the radios could not properly relay messages 
by the Hutus, then the systematic killings would have been made much more difficult to complete 
and wouldn’t have caused a high cost or danger to the U.S. This would have been the best 
solution for the U.S. to use to combat the Rwanda genocide. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
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 Overall it is evident that intervening on genocide has not been a popular action in 
U.S. history. Primarily during the Clinton administration, a wide range of excuses were used to 
support a policy of neutrality and non-intervention. This included the cost of involvement, the 
risk of losing soldier life, and endangering the security of America. In general these reasons lack 
strength, because humanitarian efforts caused a higher cost, and there are many forms of 
intervention that have low risk and the U.S. is one of the strongest nations. The nations 
responsible for genocide lack the resources to attack back on U.S. soil, which does not create a 
plausible danger for the U.S. Also the U.S. should not hold the value of U.S. lives higher than the 
victims being murdered. For most it is reasonable to say a dozen or so U.S. soldiers would not 
equal thousands of lives of the defenseless. From the time the U.S. signed the Genocide 
Convention under President Reagan, it had a reluctance to intervene on the sovereignty of other 
nations due to genocide. Instead of this fading it only worsened as genocide began to unfold. It is 
clear to see that the fear of even using the word genocide would hold the U.S. accountable to act 
and protect others. As a strong nation, this seems weak and pathetic for the U.S. to fail to 
intervene.  
Many lessons can be learned from studying the genocides which have occurred and 
viewing the compelling arguments towards intervention. To start with a major reason President 
Clinton had reluctance to intervene in Rwanda was the lack of support from citizens. With 
almost no representation of that culture in the U.S., there was not a strong push to get involved. 
This shows the importance of staying informed on current world events and researching what is 
going on around you. If there is an increased awareness, the citizens directly influence the vote 
of Congress on what international matters take importance. Another important lesson is that you 
cannot always trust what political leaders are telling you. Often times they give opinionated 
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information and withhold important facts. In general the U.S. can look back at the lack of 
intervention to see it was not the appropriate course of action to take. No matter what perspective 
is taken, it is hard to argue the U.S. was right in ignoring the horrific crimes and mass killings 
which occurred in Bosnia and Rwanda. This demonstrates the importance of acting quickly in 
any matter, especially when it involves the loss of lives. Even if it is not in the best interest to 
send ground troops, there is always some form of intervention which can take place to attempt to 
end genocide.  
 After researching the case studies of Bosnia and Rwanda, I found many similarities in 
the matters. The policy of non-intervention backfired after it came to attention what the U.S. 
knew and was capable of doing. In the cases presented, the Clinton administration refused to use 
the word genocide and would tell the people a civil war was occurring with both sides 
committing crimes, when in fact they knew it was not the truth. It was easier to categorize the 
events as ancient hatreds and try to divert the attention elsewhere than get involved. The U.S. 
should also not have allowed other foreign affairs happening at the same time to create a 
negative view on intervening on this separate matter. For Bosnia they claimed it would turn into 
another Vietnam and become a costly war impossible to leave. With Rwanda President Clinton 
feared it would turn into another event like the failed humanitarian aid delivery in Somalia which 
caused negative views on his administration. Even though there were a number of similarities in 
Bosnia and Rwanda, it is also important to recognize the differences. In Bosnia there was an 
increases awareness of the events as they were occurring. Also because of the location and other 
parallels with the Holocaust, there was a heightened anxiety. As previously stated there was not a 
large interest in Rwanda and a generalized negative perception of African culture. Another 
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important fact is the difference in press coverage. What the news focuses on creates a big impact 
on the views back in the U.S.  
In the future I would conduct further research and analysis on other cases of genocide. A 
main case I would like to focus on would be Kosovo. This interests me particularly because 
unlike Bosnia and Rwanda, the U.S. did intervene in the matter. Overall I know the intervention 
was positive with a low cost to the U.S. It also included using air strikes and other military 
support without causalities. This would further support my claim by showing intervention is 
possible using military power and does not create harm for the United States. On a long-term 
level this would create a U.S. strategic advantage by allowing international alliances which could 
further benefit the American economy through trade and benefit military by establishing new for 
military bases. In general terms this shows how the United States may have to give some 
sacrifice for intervention but overall receives the higher gain.  
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